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Abstract 
This paper examines six different approaches to nutrient management and simulates the 
economic costs and environmental impacts associated with them using NManager, a partial 
equilibrium simulation model developed by Motu and NIWA. In particular, we focus on Lake 
Rotorua in the Bay of Plenty in New Zealand, where the regional council is concerned with the 
decline in water quality in the lake and has set a goal to restore the lake to its condition during 
the 1960s. 
Reaching this goal will require significant reductions in the amount of nutrients 
discharged into the lake, especially from non-point sources such as farm land. Managing water 
quality is made difficult by the presence of groundwater lags in the catchment: nutrients that 
leach from the soil arrive at the lake over multiple years. The mitigation schemes we consider are 
land retirement, requiring best practice, explicit nitrogen limits on landowners, a simple export 
trading scheme and two more complex trading schemes that account for groundwater lags. 
We demonstrate that best practice alone is not sufficient to meet the environmental 
target for Lake Rotorua. Under an export trading scheme the distribution of mitigation across 
the catchment is more cost effective than its distribution under explicit limits on landowners or 
land retirement. However, the more complex trading schemes do not result in sufficient gains in 
cost effectiveness over the simple scheme to justify their implementation as there is minimal (or 
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Lake Rotorua is one of thirteen major lakes in the Bay of Plenty region of New Zealand. 
It has significant cultural value and provides numerous tourism opportunities. Te Arawa (the 
local iwi) have ancestral ties to the lake and surrounding land reaching back more than 600 years 
and today 35% of residents are of Maori ancestry. The Ministry of Tourism estimates the region 
attracts three million visitors annually, a quarter of whom are from overseas. 
Land use in the catchment surrounding the lake has intensified since the 1960s and this 
has resulted in increased discharges to the lake of nitrogen Prabodanie, R. A. Ranga et al. (2003), 
(Rutherford, 2008) and phosphorus (Rutherford, Kit et al., 1989) to the lake. These nutrient 
discharges have led to a decline in water quality, eutrophication, toxic algal blooms and the 
intermittent closure  of the lake due to health risks Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment: Te Kaitiaki Taiao a Whare Paremata, 2006. 
Through discussion with the Rotorua District Council, Te Arawa and the community, 
the Bay of Plenty Regional Council (BoPRC) has set a target for water quality to be the same as it 
was in the 1960s (Environment Bay of Plenty et al, 2009). This involves reducing lake loads, the 
amount of nutrients arriving at the lake, to 435 tonnes of nitrogen per year (tN/yr) and 37 
tonnes of phosphorus per year (tP/yr). However, in 2009 total nutrient exports were estimated 
to be 746 tN/yr and 39.1 tP/yr and lake loads were estimated to be 556 tN/yr and 39.1 tP/yr 
(Environment Bay of Plenty et al, 2009). As a result of groundwater lags not all exports reach the 
lake at once but will be realized as lake loads over multiple years. Reaching the environmental 
targets for the lake within 100 years will require nutrient exports to decrease beneath the long 
run targets in the short term. 
There is considerable concern about the cost of these reductions and how this cost will 
be distributed. To inform decision makers and stakeholders Motu and NIWA have developed 
NManager, a research tool for nitrogen management. 
This paper considers six approaches to reducing nitrogen levels in Lake Rotorua through 
changes in land use and management. The approaches are: explicit nitrogen limits on 
landowners, requiring landowners to use best management practice, land retirement, a simple 
export trading scheme, and two more complex trading schemes base on lake loads that account 
for groundwater lags. Where possible we require the different approaches to have the same 
environmental outcomes. 8 
 
We demonstrate that an export trading scheme is significantly more cost effective than 
explicit nitrogen limits on landowners and land retirement. But our research suggests that more 
complex trading schemes do not result in sufficient gains in cost effectiveness over the simple 
scheme to justify their additional complexity and the associated administration costs. 
The Bay of Plenty Regional Council (BoPRC) has begun to address the decline in water 
quality. Their initiatives include upgrades to the storm water system and to septic tanks, treating 
phosphorus in streams and addressing land management practices (Environment Bay of Plenty 
et al, 2009). They have also introduced ‘Rule 11’ to freeze nutrient loss from land-use at 2001-
2004 levels (Environment Bay of Plenty, 2008b).
1
A nitrogen trading system is expected to be a cost effective approach to control leaching 
into the lake (Lock and Kerr, 2008). The literature on trading systems to manage environmental 
outcomes has been  historically  focused on air quality from point sources. See for example 
Montgomery (1972), Krupnick et al (1983), McGartland and Oates (1985), Hahn (1986) and 
Ermoliev et al (1996). Water quality has been considered more recently by Hung and Shaw 
(2005) and Prabodanie, R. A. Ranga et al. (2010). In 2008 Selman et al (2009) identified 57 
trading systems focused on water quality, most of which were inactive. Of these, the majority are 
concerned with point sources though some allow point sources to purchase reductions from 
nonpoint sources. 
 Despite these initiatives it appears that further 
intervention will be necessary to meet lake quality targets. 
New Zealand has some experience with allowance trading systems, namely: the 
Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system used to manage marine fisheries; the New Zealand 
Emissions Trading Scheme (NZETS) used to manage greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto 
protocol; and an export trading system that was recently established by Environment Waikato to 
manage the Lake Taupo catchment. 
In the Lake Taupo catchment, farms occupy about 20% of the land; however, they 
contribute more than 90% of the manageable nitrogen load (Rutherford, Kit and Cox, Tim, 
2009). Environment Waikato has implemented a straightforward ‘cap-and-trade’ scheme to 
prevent nutrients in the lake increasing beyond their present levels and has overseen the creation 
of a charitable trust called the Lake Taupo Protection Trust charged with the permanent removal 
                                                 
1 A review of ‘Rule 11’ suggests there is little quantitative evidence of its effectiveness and that more active 
enforcement is required (Foster et al, 2009). 9 
 
of 20 percent of the manageable nitrogen Young et al, 2010. Table 1 gives the land areas, 
leaching and total exports of the different land types included in NManager.
2
Table 1: Land area and base leaching in NManager 
 
  Land Area  Leaching per Hectare 
(kg N / ha / yr) 
Exports to the Lake 
(t N / yr) 
Dairy  5,363  56  300 
Sheep & Beef  14,481  16  232 
Forestry  19,437  4  78 
Waipa Forest  1,586  2  3 
Lifestyle  894  16  14 
Urban  2,076  10  28 
Septic Tanks  256  85  22 
Tikitere  28  1071  30 
Whakarewarewa  24  10  0.24 
Rotorua Land 
Treatment System 
300  112.2  34 
Total  45,185    756 
Figure  1  gives  nitrogen  exports and loads  in the Lake Rotorua catchment used in 
NManager assuming current land use and farming practices continue. It also provides the target 
of 435 tN/yr specified by EBOP et al (2009) and the unmanageable N loads used in NManager. 
   
                                                 
2 Note the total exports to the lake are not equal to the sum of the exports to the lake as they include some 
nitrogen from outside the surface water catchment that enters the catchment via groundwater (Rutherford et al, 
2011). 10 
 
Figure 1: Exports and Imports with no change in land-use 
 
At present NManager assumes that 756 tN/yr are exported from the catchment but only 
520 tN/yr are currently realized as lake loads (Environment Bay of Plenty et al, 2009). This 
difference is due to the delay of nitrogen in the groundwater. Unmanageable loads are those 
arising from nutrients already in the groundwater and exports that cannot be controlled via land 
management. The unmanageable exports consist of 4 kg/ha/yr across the entire catchment (the 
minimum possible leaching per hectare) and all leaching from the Rotorua Land Treatment 
System,  septic tanks, and  geothermal and urban areas. NManager considers 278  tN/yr as 
unmanageable exports. These are being addressed by other BoPRC initiatives. 
It is obvious that significant reductions in nitrogen are required to meet the water quality 
targets specified by BoPRC. Rutherford et al (2011) calculate that exports need to be reduced by 
c. 320 tN/yr in order to meet the load target. Hence more severe intervention will be needed for 
Lake Rotorua than was necessary for Lake Taupo. 
The paper is set out as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the models which support 
our research and Section 3 introduces the NManager model. Different regulatory approaches are 
introduced in Section 4 and methods of solving them in Section 5. The performance of different 
regulations is discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Supporting Models 
NManager combines data from several external models with its own internal calculations. 
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2.1.  Farmax 
Farmax is a decision support model developed by AgResearch. It has been designed to 
assist dairy and sheep & beef farmers to maximize their productivity by simulating the 
profitability of farms under different management scenarios. Farmax has been evaluated against 
two independent New Zealand data sets (Bryant, Jeremy et al., 2010). 
Many management decisions affect not only the profitability of a farm but the amount of 
nutrient that leaches from it. In Farmax these decisions include: farm type (for dairy, the milking 
herd and dry stock were treated differently), stocking rate, fertilizer use, supplementary feed use, 
the choice of winter fodder crops and whether animals are grazed on or off the land (Bryant, 
Jeremy et al., 2010). Research by Male et al (2010) suggests that clearing gorse has real mitigation 
potential, however this is not included in Farmax. 
Outputs from Farmax are used, in conjunction with OVERSEER, to give feasible and 
realistic combinations of profit and nutrient exports. From these we express profit per hectare 
per year as a function of mitigation per hectare per year. Further details are given in section 3.4 
and Appendix B. For the simulations run in Farmax we direct the reader to Smeaton et al. 
(forthcoming). 
2.2.  OVERSEER  
OVERSEER is a farm management tool developed by AgResearch to help farmers 
maximize the productivity of their land AgResearch, 2010. It also calculates nutrients lost to the 
environment, and this has drawn the attention of regulatory bodies. OVERSEER is used to 
quantify the export of nitrogen from each farm in the catchment as a function of land use and 
the type of soil. 
The data inputs for OVERSEER are extensive and include: farm type, productivity (e.g., 
tonnes/year milk solids for dairy), soil type, soil drainage class, slope, rainfall, stocking rate, 
fertiliser use, supplementary feed and area for effluent irrigation. The use of nitrogen inhibitors is 
included for on-farm mitigation. Changes in any of these inputs affect nutrient loss. 
2.3.  ROTAN 
The Rotorua and Ta
ROTAN simulates the hydrogeology of the Lake Rotorua catchment. It distinguishes 
between nutrient exports and nutrient loads. Nutrient exports are the quantity of nutrients 
upo Nutrient model (ROTAN) is a geographic information system 
(GIS) based catchment hydrology and water quality model developed by the National Institute of 
Water & Atmospheric Research (NIWA) (Rutherford et al, 2008). 12 
 
discharged from the land. Nutrient loads are the quantity of nutrients reaching the lake. The 
translation from exports to loads  is neither complete nor immediate due to attenuation  and 
groundwater lags (Kerr and Rutherford, 2008). 
Attenuation is the temporary storage and/or permanent removal of nutrients from 
runoff, groundwater or stream flow. Some nutrients are taken up by plants before reaching the 
lake. However, this uptake is temporary; the nutrients are released following the death of the 
plant. Permanent removal of nitrogen occurs principally through denitrification, the conversion 
of nitrate into nitrogen gas. Attenuation has been found to be minimal in most of the Lake 
Rotorua catchment, with the exception of the Puarenga (Rutherford et al, 2009) (Rutherford et 
al, 2011). 
Groundwater lags are present across the Lake Rotorua catchment due to the presence of 
large underground aquifers. When nitrogen leaches off farmland, a certain amount is carried by 
surface water (streams) and  enters the lake  directly. The remainder enters the underground 
aquifers from where it is slowly released into the lake. ROTAN simulations suggest that 30% of 
nitrogen reaches  the lake via surface water and 70% via groundwater. Groundwater lags 
determine the speed at which the nitrogen in the aquifers arrives at the lake. 
Groundwater lags are defined for each parcel of land in the catchment. The lag for each 
parcel is described by its mean residence time (MRT), the mean time that nitrogen spends in the 
groundwater. They depend on the distance of the exports from the lake, the size and speed of 
surface water streams, and the geology of the soil and underlying rock. For land close to the lake 
groundwater lags are small. The lags increase the further land is from the lake and probably 
exceed 200 years for some nitrogen emitted at the edge of the catchment. 
NIWA has  extensively calibrated ROTAN to historical data from the Lake Rotorua 
catchment  using information about groundwater lags estimated using tracers, and aquifer 
boundaries, provided by GNS-Science (Rutherford et al, 2009) (Rutherford et al, 2011). GNS-
Science is using a fine detailed finite-element model to refine the current estimates of aquifer 
boundaries, flow pathways and travel times (Dr Chris Daughney, GNS-Science, pers. comm.). 
Refinement of aquifer boundaries and associated residence times within ROTAN are the subject 
of ongoing NIWA and GNS-Science research (Rutherford et al, 2008). 13 
 
3. The NManager Model 
NManager is intended to reflect the complex biophysical properties of the catchment and 
the behavior of landowners under regulation.  This section details  how the reality of the 
catchment is represented in NManager. 
3.1.  Modelling the transportation of nutrients to the lake 
Groundwater lags are represented in NManager using simplified output from ROTAN. 
For ease of analysis parcels were aggregated into eight groundwater lag zones based on their 
MRTs. All parcels within the same zone were treated as having the same MRT. Lag zone 1, the 
closest to the lake, has the smallest MRT and lag zone 8, the furthest from the lake, has the 
largest MRT. Table 2 gives the MRT, size and percentage of nutrients in the catchment for each 
lag zone. Figure 2 shows the catchment by groundwater lag zone. 
Table 2: Overview of the groundwater lag zones. 
Lag Zone  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
MRT (years)  2.5  8  15  30  50  70  90  110 
Number of ha  150  1,390  2,335  6,855  8,290  9,440  11,610  5,090 
Nutrients 
Transported (%) 
0.2  3.4  5.1  12.8  19.0  25.5  24.7  9.3 
Figure 2: NManager groundwater lag zones 
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In NManager groundwater lags are described by a series of Unit Response Functions 
(URFs), one for each lag zone. URFs describe the nitrogen loads from a single unit of nitrogen 
entering the groundwater as a function of time since export. They were constructed by fitting an 
exponential curve to output from ROTAN adjusted for MRT. See Cox et al, (forthcoming) for 
further details. 
Figure 3 gives the URFs used by NManager. Each curve gives the cumulative percentage 
of nitrogen, from the groundwater, exported at time zero that has since arrived in the lake as a 
function of time. For example, if nitrogen is exported from lag zones 3 and 5, then after 40 years 
80% of the nitrogen from lag zone 3 and 40% of the nitrogen from lag zone 5 that entered into 
the groundwater will have reached the lake. 
Figure 3: Unit Response Functions by groundwater lag zone 
 
Nitrogen exports from a single year result in loads to the lake over multiple years as 
expressed by the URFs. These loads are additive across time and across different locations in the 
catchment.  The  nitrogen  load at time 𝑡, from parcel 𝑖, delivered via groundwater can be 
expressed as follows: 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝐺𝑊




Where  𝜌𝐺𝑊  is the proportion of nitrogen  exports delivered to the lake via groundwater 
(ROTAN suggests 𝜌𝐺𝑊 = 30%), 𝑓𝑖(𝜏) is the quantity of N exported from parcel 𝑖 at time 𝜏; and 
ℎ𝑖(∙) is the URF for the lag zone associated with the parcel. NManager evaluates this sum using 
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Nitrogen loads delivered via surface water arrive in the lake in the same year they are 
exported. The load, from parcel 𝑖, delivered via surface water at time 𝑡, can be expressed as 
follows: 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑆𝑊
𝑖 (𝑡) = (1 − 𝜌𝐺𝑊)𝑓𝑖(𝑡) 
And the total load to the lake at time 𝑡 can be expressed as: 





𝑖 (𝑡) ) 
3.2.  Legacy loads 
BoPRC has specified environmental targets for Lake Rotorua in terms of annual nitrogen 
loads. The regulations considered by NManager largely affect dairy and sheep & beef farming. 
Legacy loads and loads arising from unmanageable exports contribute to the total lake load and 
must therefore be adjusted for when considering what loads should be targeted by changes in 
land management practices. 
Legacy loads are the nitrogen loads already present in the Lake Rotorua groundwater that 
will be realized as inputs to the lake in future years. These loads are the result of groundwater 
lags acting on historic exports from agricultural land-use and septic tanks. They are independent 
of future land-use and cannot be targeted by mitigation. Figure 4 gives the legacy loads estimated 
by ROTAN. These are incorporated into NManager using the exponential curve fitted to the 
results. 
Figure 4: Legacy loads: ROTAN results from 2009 
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3.3.  Modelling the use of land in the catchment 
Landowners’ responses  to regulation will depend on their current land-use. We are 
interested in the uses that land is being put to and where those land uses are taking place. 
Land-use and location are specified in NManager using the ROTAN map for current 
land-use (National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research, dataset, 2011). This map was 
constructed in two steps: A 2005 land use map was constructed by BoPRC based on 2003 aerial 
photographs of land cover and results from a land use questionnaire sent to landowners in 2005. 
This map was updated to a 2010 land use map using 2007 aerial photographs, a map of dairy 
land cover and local knowledge (Rutherford et al, 2011). 
Due to similarities between leaching rates, and uncertainty, some land use categories were 
merged together. Bare ground, horticulture, lifestyle, dairy drystock and different types of sheep 
and cattle farming were merged into a sheep & beef category. Scrub, wetlands and different types 
of forest were merged into a forestry category. Cropping was merged with dairy. The resulting 
land-use categories in NManager  are: Dairy, Forestry, Sheep & Beef, the Rotorua Land 
Treatment System, Septic  Tanks, Tikitere geothermal area, Whakarewarewa geothermal area, 
Urban and Urban open space. These are estimated to a 1 hectare spatial scale. 
Of these categories only nitrogen exports from the dairy and sheep & beef farming 
categories are considered manageable by landowners’ farming practices. Other initiatives have 
been launched by BoPRC to address nitrogen leaching from septic tanks, the geothermal areas 
and urban runoff (Environment Bay of Plenty et al, 2009). 
Leaching from forestry and scrub  land  is small and  cannot be further mitigated via 
different land management. However, some land classified as scrub is covered in gorse and has a 
high rate of nitrogen loss. Replacing gorse land with forestry is expected to result in a 40 tN/yr 
reduction in nitrogen leaching Male et al, 2010. Separating gorse from other scrub land has been 
left for future research. 
Figure 5 gives the distribution of land-use in each lag zone. We have combined the 
smaller land uses into a single category labelled ‘Other’. We observe that there is very little land 
in the first three lag zones, dairy is concentrated in lag zones 4 to 7 and sheep & beef farming is 
spread across all lag zones. 
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Figure 5: Proportion of land use by groundwater lag zone 
 
3.4.  The shape of the profit functions 
We  model landowners’ land management practices using profit functions. Profit 
functions express the profit of the farm, per hectare per year, as a function of mitigation, per 
hectare per year. Mitigation occurs via changes in stocking rates, fertiliser and nitrogen inhibitor 
usage and farm management. Farms are permitted to change to less nitrogen intensive land-uses. 
NManager distinguishes between land used for dairy farming and sheep & beef farming 
by representing each with a different profit function.  It assumes farms of both types are 
homogeneous and have the same leaching and profit per hectare before regulation across the 
catchment. These are given in Table 3. 
Table 3: Leaching and Profit by land-use before regulation 
Land-use  Dairy  Sheep & Beef  Forestry 
Leaching (kg/ha/yr)  56  16  4 
Manageable Leaching (kg/ha/yr)  52  12  0 
Profit ($/ha/yr)  1,400  450  267 
Under regulation landowners may choose less nitrogen intensive land uses. Dairy farm 
land may be converted to sheep & beef farming or forestry and sheep & beef farm land may be 
converted to forestry. This is represented in the model by continuous profit functions that span 
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Figure 6 and Figure 7 give the profit functions for dairy farm land and sheep & beef farm 
land respectively. These are fitted as quadratic curves to simulation results from Farmax and 
OVERSEER. As the curves are concave, the marginal cost of mitigation increases as mitigation 
increases. 
Note that the profit curve for dairy farms spans the simulation results for sheep & beef 
farms and intersects the result for forestry profit, and that the profit curve for sheep & beef 
farms intersects the result for forestry profit. In addition, some results were included even 
though they were dominated by other results. This was done in an attempt to recognise 
heterogeneity between farmers, so the curves are more reflective of an average farmer. 
Figure 6: Dairy land profit function 
 
Figure 7: Sheep and Beef land profit function 
 























































These profit functions make a number of assumptions: First, they assume that the cost of 
converting land to a less nitrogen intensive land-use is small. Second, as they are expressed on a 
per hectare basis, they assume there are no fixed costs for farm management and hence no 
economies of scale. And last, they assume present conditions persist. Abnormal weather 
conditions (e.g. drought) and changes in commodity prices may give significantly different results 
from those predicted. Refining the profit functions to address these assumptions  and to 
represent heterogeneity among farmers remains a topic for future research. 
4. The Design of Regulation 
Regulation  could be used to  improve the water quality of Lake Rotorua. Without 
regulation, landowners’ profit maximizing objectives are not consistent with the wider society’s 
water quality objectives. Regulation aims to control landowners’  behaviour or to provide 
financial incentives for landowners to manage and reduce their nitrogen exports to meet the 
objectives of society. 
We are interested in the implications of different regulations and their cost effectiveness 
for reaching the mitigation targets. In this section we specify six approaches available to BoPRC. 
In order of complexity they are:  requiring  best practice;  land retirement; an export capping 
scheme, requiring all landowners to reduce their nitrogen export by a specified percentage; an 
export trading scheme  where landowners must hold sufficient allowances to cover nitrogen 
leaching from their property each year; and two vintage trading schemes  which attempt to 
incorporate the timing of nitrogen loads, via groundwater, into the regulatory scheme in a simple 
way. The trading schemes follow the design given in Lock and Kerr (2008) and Kerr et al (2007). 
These approaches will be evaluated using NManager in section 6. 
4.1.  Best practice 
Output from Farmax and OVERSEER provides estimates of the standard and minimum 
possible leaching for dairy and sheep & beef farming. We model the adoption of best practice by 
assuming leaching is reduced to the minimum possible leaching suggested by the Farmax and 
OVERSEER results included in our profit functions. 
This is modelled as a step change in leaching from business as usual in 2015. Leaching 
from all dairy land is reduced to 28 kg/ha/yr and leaching from all sheep & beef land is reduced 
to 10 kg/ha/yr. We assume that there is no change in land-use. 20 
 
4.2.  Land retirement 
For modelling land retirement we assume all mitigation comes from some landowners 
changing their land-use to al less nitrogen intensive use. This occurs as a step change in 2015. 
There is no change in the leaching rates per hectare for each land-use. 
In NManager, sheep & beef land is initially retired to become forest before dairy land is 
retired to new sheep & beef land. If necessary, this new sheep & beef land is then retired into 
forestry. We assume that land is retired equally across the catchment, hence land retirement in 
each year can be described by three percentages: the percentage of initial sheep & beef land that 
has been retired into forest, the percentage of dairy land that has been retired into new sheep & 
beef land, and the percentage of this new sheep & beef land that has been retired into forestry. 
We briefly consider retirement of land as specified in the R-300 ROTAN scenario which 
reduces exports from their current level by 300 tN/yr by a step change in 2015. The R-300 
scenario details that all dairy land is converted to sheep & beef, and around 16% of the sheep & 
beef land is converted to new lifestyle blocks or forestry (Rutherford et al, 2011). The leaching 
from sheep & beef land decreases to 14.4 kg/ha/yr and the leaching from new lifestyle blocks is 
10 kg/ha/yr. 
4.3.  An export capping scheme 
Under an export capping scheme the regulator specifies the maximum acceptable levels 
of nitrogen exports for all land in the catchment. This is similar to ‘Rule 11’ where nutrient 
leaching on each property in the catchment has been capped at 2001-2004 levels (Environment 
Bay of Plenty, 2008a). An export capping system could be thought of as a tightening of the caps 
on each property imposed by ‘Rule 11’. 
The  export capping  scheme  we consider  requires all landowners to reduce the 
manageable nitrogen leaching from their property to a fixed level of leaching. The acceptable 
levels of leaching are  determined by a percentage reductions  in the manageable leaching 
estimated in OVERSEER for dairy and sheep & beef farming.  For example, with a 30% 
reduction landowners must ensure that the manageable leaching from dairy and sheep & beef 
land is less that 36.4 and 8.4 kg/ha/yr (30% reduction from 52 and 12) respectively. The 
percentage reduction would be uniform across the catchment but could change from year to 
year. 
These reductions may result in levels of total leaching that are less than the minimum 
possible leaching from the current land-use (for example: total leaching under regulation must be 21 
 
less than 10 kg/ha/yr for a sheep & beef farm). Where this occurs changes in land-use will be 
necessary to meet the leaching reduction. We assume that the landowner will convert some 
proportion of their land to a less nitrogen intensive land-use and will satisfy the leaching 
reduction ‘on average’ across their farm. 
Using a uniform percentage reduction in manageable leaching across the catchment is 
unlikely to be cost effective. In order to determine more cost effective percentages to assign to 
each lag zone or to each land-use type the regulator must have information about the mitigation 
costs faced by each landowner. Acquiring this information is recognised as being difficult and 
costly Tietenberg, 1996. Hence we assume the absence of this information and use a uniform 
percentage across the catchment. 
An export capping scheme may be desirable as the approach is well established, both in 
the literature and in practice, and is typically straightforward to implement. Unfortunately there 
has been no evidence that ‘Rule 11’ has been successful in capping nutrient exports since its 
introduction. Recommendations to BoPRC identify weaknesses in the monitoring and enforcing 
of ‘Rule 11’ (Foster and Kivell, 2009). As the export capping scheme could be introduced in a 
very similar way it may inherit the faults of the ‘Rule 11’ regulation. 
4.4.  An export trading scheme 
The environmental targets for Lake Rotorua are specified in terms of acceptable nitrogen 
loads to the lake. However, landowners manage the amount of nitrogen they put onto the land, 
from which it is relatively easy to estimate exports from their property (for example, using 
OVERSEER), but difficult to estimate loads reaching the lake. This suggests that regulation 
which targets exports will be more straightforward than regulation which targets lake loads. 
Under an export trading scheme the regulator provides a supply of export allowances. At 
the end of each year landowners must surrender sufficient allowances to cover the nitrogen 
leaching from their property for that year. Landowners who do not have sufficient allowances to 
cover their leaching will have to purchase unused allowances from landowners with excess 
allowances, reduce their exports or risk non-compliance. By controlling the supply of export 
allowances a regulator can manage the amount of nitrogen that reaches the lake. 
There has already been experience with this design of regulatory scheme in New Zealand. 
An export trading scheme has been  implemented  in  the catchment about Lake Taupo, the 
biggest lake in New Zealand. Although groundwater lags are present in the Lake Taupo 
catchment,  Environment Waikato chose not to implement regulation that incorporated 
groundwater lags  or attenuation, because of uncertainty in the underlying biophysics, and 22 
 
because of the likely complexity of the regulatory and trading schemes. Some farmers lobbied for 
both attenuation and groundwater lags to be considered. However  it was felt that this was 
unnecessary (Environment Waikato, 2003). 
A trading scheme is desirable as it encourages mitigation to occur where it is most cost 
effective. Profit maximizing landowners will mitigate as long as the cost of mitigation is less than 
the price of the allowances they would otherwise have to hold. The price of allowances will be 
such that all allowances are used and the marginal landowner is indifferent between further 
mitigation and purchasing additional allowances. It follows that under a trading scheme the least 
costly mitigation activities will take place first. For this reason a trading scheme is generally more 
cost effective than an export capping approach. 
In this study there is no difference between farms of the same type (e.g. between dairy 
farms) in their nitrogen exports of costs of mitigation. Hence trading encourages mitigation on 
whichever land-use it is cheapest. In reality, there are differences between farms of the same 
type, so trading will encourage mitigation on whichever farm it is cheapest. 
Despite this, a trading scheme does not overcome all the administrative difficulties of an 
export capping scheme. Successful implementation of a trading scheme requires the regulator to 
have good monitoring and enforcement in place. Furthermore, the regulator must determine the 
initial allocation of allowances. This can be an extensive political process with high potential 
costs. 
4.5.  Vintage trading 
Groundwater lags are known to be prevalent in the Lake Rotorua catchment. Taking 
account of groundwater lags in the design of regulation may  result in more cost effective 
regulation as landowners will surrender allowances that better correspond to their lake loads. We 
consider two simple vintage trading schemes that attempt to reflect the timing of nitrogen loads 
to the lake. These schemes attempt to link lake loads to exports via vintage allowances. 
A vintage trading scheme works in a similar way to an export trading scheme. The main 
difference is that vintage allowances permit landowners to release nitrogen into the lake, rather 
than to export nitrogen from their land. Therefore landowners are trading rights for lake loads 
not exports. Under regulation, landowners need to surrender allowances at the end of each year 
to cover the lake loads that will be caused by the nitrogen leaching from their property from that 
year. 23 
 
Due to the continuous nature of groundwater leaching some approximation is required 
for a vintage trading scheme to be implemented in practice. The design of regulation must 
provide some convention that specifies for landowners the vintage allowances they need to 
surrender in each year. We consider two possible regulatory conventions; the one pulse vintage 
scheme and the two pulse vintage scheme. These follow the design of a vintage scheme given in 
Kerr et al (2007). 
The one pulse vintage scheme allocates every lag zone a lag time to approximate the 
mean groundwater lag time. In each year, landowners must surrender allowances of the vintage 
that corresponds to the current year plus their lag time. For example, suppose a landowner with 
a lag time of 6 years exports nitrogen in 2020. Under the one pulse trading scheme they must 
surrender vintage allowances for the year 2026. 
Table 4 summarizes the lags for the one pulse vintage scheme. These lags were selected 
as the average travel time for all water (30% of the surface water time of zero plus 70% of the 
groundwater time represented by the MRTs for each lag zone). They correspond to the time by 
which all of the surface water and at least one third of the groundwater have reached the lake. 
Table 4: Lag Times for the One Pulse Vintage Scheme 
Groundwater lag zone  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Lag times  1 yrs  6 yrs  11 yrs  21 yrs  35 yrs  49 yrs  63 yrs  77 yrs 
Recall that 30% of nitrogen reaches the lake via surface water and 70% via groundwater. 
The two pulse vintage scheme allocates every lag zone a lag time but this lag time applies only to 
groundwater leaching. In each year landowners surrender allowances for the nitrogen leaching 
from their property in that year. 30% of these allowances must be from the vintage that 
corresponds to the current year (to cover surface water leaching) and 70% of these allowances 
must be from the vintage that corresponds to the current year plus their lag time (to cover 
groundwater leaching). For example, a landowner with a lag time of 15 years exports 100 kg of 
nitrogen in 2020. Under the two pulse trading scheme they must surrender 30 kg worth of 2020 
vintage allowances and 70 kg worth of 2035 vintage allowances.  These allowances are 
surrendered in the year 2020. 
Table 5 summarizes the lags for the two pulse scheme. These lags were selected to match 
the MRTs for each lag zone. They correspond to the time at which 60% of nitrogen exports 
from the current year will have arrived at the lake. 
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Table 5: Lag Times for the Two Pulse Vintage Scheme 
Groundwater lag zone  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Lag times  2 yrs  8 yrs  15 yrs  30 yrs  50 yrs  70 yrs  90 yrs  110 yrs 
Under a vintage trading scheme,  gains in  cost effectiveness  may arise from trading 
between lag zones. A landowner at the back of the catchment may choose either to mitigate in 
the present year or to purchase allowances from a landowner closer to the lake. Purchasing 
allowances from a landowner closer to the lake delays the timing of mitigation: rather than the 
landowner at the back of the catchment mitigating now, the landowner at the front of the 
catchment will mitigate in the future. Consequently, this sort of trading reduces the net present 
value of the cost of mitigation. 
In theory a trading scheme is desirable as it encourages mitigation to occur where it is 
most cost effective. The advantage of a vintage trading scheme over an export trading scheme is 
that the vintage scheme attempts to incorporate groundwater lags and treats landowners 
differently depending on the timing of their contribution to lake loads. This may result in a more 
cost effective allocation of mitigation as the distribution of mitigation may be closer to the 
distribution of the generation of lake loads. 
However, unlike the export trading scheme, vintage trading schemes have never been 
implemented. This may be because the complexity of these schemes would make them difficult 
to implement and administer. There may also be significant price risk for some landowners. For 
a landowner close to the lake who sells allowances, there is a risk the price of mitigation will 
increase, so they will not be able to afford to mitigate in the future. Conversely, if the same 
landowner buys allowances now to use in the future they run the risk that the price of allowances 
will drop. Furthermore these risks will differ between landowners: landowners with the longest 
lag times will face the least uncertainty as they are the first to surrender allowances of any given 
vintage, while landowners with the shortest lag time are the last to surrender allowances of any 
given type. There may also be dependences between vintages (see Appendix C). 
5. Simulating Landowner Behaviour under Regulation 
For a specified regulatory system, NManager determines the pattern of nitrogen exports 
that will be chosen by profit maximizing landowners.  Furthermore, for  a  specified  set of 
environmental targets and given regulatory scheme NManager can determine the appropriate 
reductions in total exports that will ensure landowners’ profit maximizing behavior meets those 25 
 
targets. These solutions are unique. This section specifies how NManager solves for the optimal 
pattern of nitrogen exports to meet given targets under the different regulatory schemes. 
5.1.  Solving the export capping scheme 
Under the export capping scheme landowners’ profit maximizing quantity of nitrogen 
exports is the maximum quantity of nutrients permitted for their land. This result holds assuming 
there are no voluntary changes in land-use. 
Given the  current regulation imposed by ‘Rule 11’ landowners are prohibited from 
increasing their nutrient use above current levels. This prevents landowners changing their 
current  land-uses  to more nitrogen intensive and potentially more profitable  land-uses.
3
For a specified series of environmental targets NManager determines the percentage 
reductions in manageable exports required for each year that ensures nutrient targets are met. We 
can establish a series of equations that express lake loads as a function of exports as follows: 
 
Furthermore, as less nutrient intensive land uses are less profitable it is reasonable to assume that 
most landowners will not voluntarily change their land-use to a less nutrient intensive land-use. 
Let 𝑦𝑠,𝑡 be the amount of nitrogen that leaches from dairy and sheep & beef land, and let 
𝑧𝑠,𝑡 be the amount of nitrogen that leaches from all other land, at time 𝑠 ( 𝑠  ≥ 0 ) and arrives in 
the lake at time 𝑡  before  the introduction of regulation  ( 𝑦𝑠,𝑡 , 𝑧𝑠,𝑡 = 0 if 𝑠 > 𝑡). We can 
therefore express the total lake loads in year 𝑡, as: 





As the export capping  scheme enforces equal reductions for all land across the 
catchment a percentage decrease in exports results in the same percentage decrease in 
corresponding loads to the lake. Let 𝑑𝑠  be the percentage decrease in exports  imposed  by 
regulation for year 𝑠. We can express the total lake loads, under regulation, in year 𝑡, as: 





To determine the percentage reductions that should be imposed by regulation we fix 
some bound on time and consider exports and loads up to this time, so 𝑡  ∈ [0,𝑇]. We can then 
express the required total loads as a function of the percentage reductions using the above 
                                                 
3 Anecdotal evidence suggests ‘Rule 11’ has assisted in preventing an increase in dairy farming in the Lake 
Rotorua/Rotoiti catchment (Maki, 2009). 26 
 
equation. This results in a system of simultaneous equations that we solve for 𝑑𝑠 for all 𝑠. As 
𝑦𝑠,𝑡 = 0 if 𝑠 > 𝑡 this system will always have a unique solution. 
5.2.  Solving for land retirement 
We solve for the percentage of dairy and sheep & beef land retired under land-retirement 
regulation using a three-step  extension of the export capping  solution.  We determine the 
percentage of original sheep & beef land retired into forestry, followed by the percentage of dairy 
land retired into sheep & beef, and finally the percentage of new sheep & beef land retired into 
forestry. 
First redefine 𝑦𝑠,𝑡 to be the amount of nitrogen that leaches from original sheep & beef 
land in excess of that which would leach from the same land if it were used for forestry, and 
redefine 𝑧𝑠,𝑡 to be all other leaching. The percentage of sheep & beef land retired is then given 
by 𝑑𝑠. We interpret 𝑑𝑠 > 1 (more than 100% of sheep & beef land retired) as 𝑑𝑠 = 1 (100% of 
sheep & beef land retired) with the retirement of some dairy land required. 
Given this solution we redefine 𝑦𝑠,𝑡 to be the leaching from dairy land, and redefine 𝑧𝑠,𝑡 
to be all other leaching (after the retirement of sheep & beef land). The percentage of dairy land 
retired is then given by 𝑑𝑠. We interpret 𝑑𝑠 > 1 (more than 100% of dairy land retired) as 
𝑑𝑠 = 1  (100% of dairy land retired) with the retirement of some new sheep &  beef land 
required. The percentage of new sheep & beef land retired is calculated in the same way. 
5.3.  Solving a trading scheme 
For a trading scheme with given allowance caps, NManager  determines landowners’ 
profit maximising quantity of nitrogen exports, in each time period, by finding the allowance 
price under which the supply of allowances equals the demand for allowances. This price will be 
equal to the cost of the last unit of mitigation. The algorithm attempts to replicate the behaviour 
of a decentralized market by updating the price of allowances in response to excess supply and 
excess demand. 




readers may wish to skip forward to section  . The vintage trading schemes can be understood 
using a generalization of the export trading scheme approach, see Appendix A for further details. 
   
                                                 
4 We thank Andrew Coleman who provided a prototype of this optimization routine. 27 
 
Suppose there are 𝑀 landowners. Production for landowner 𝑖 at time 𝑡 depends on their 
quantity of nitrogen exports 𝑥𝑖𝑡. The profit for landowner 𝑖, at time 𝑡 is given as follows. 
𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓 𝑖( 𝑥𝑖𝑡 ) 
Let 𝑃𝑡 be the current price of allowances in year 𝑡. Profit seeking landowners will choose 
𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗  the quantity of N exports that maximizes their profit less the opportunity cost of holding 
allowances as follows: 
𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ (𝑃t) = 𝐚𝐫𝐠𝐦𝐚𝐱 [𝑓 𝑖(𝑥𝑖𝑡) − 𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑃𝑡] 
The total demand for allowances of in year 𝑡 is given by: 




Let 𝑆𝑡 be the allowance cap (the supply of allowances) in year 𝑡. The excess demand for 
allowances, 𝐹𝑡, can be expressed as follows: 
𝐹𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡 =  𝑔(𝑃𝑡) − 𝑆𝑡 
The market clearing prices will be {𝑃𝑡} such that for all allowances: 
 𝐹𝑡 ≤ 0   𝑎𝑛𝑑   𝐹𝑡 𝑃𝑡 = 0 
In a decentralized market the price depends on the supply and demand in that market. 
Therefore we may express the price for each allowance as follows: 
𝑃𝑡 = ℎ( 𝐷𝑡,𝑆𝑡 ) =  ℎ( 𝑔(𝑃𝑡), 𝑆𝑡 ) 
Given price in this form we then use an iterative numerical method to determine the 
price of allowances in equilibrium. See Appendix A for further details. 
For a specified environmental target, NManager determines the allowance caps for each 
year that ensures nutrient targets are met. This is done using an iterative approach. We compare 
the lake loads that result from a set of caps with the acceptable lake loads. The allowance caps 
are then tightened if the current lake loads exceed acceptable loads and are loosened if acceptable 
lake loads exceed current lake loads. 28 
 
6. The Performance of Different Regulatory Schemes 
This section presents simulation results from NManager  for the regulatory schemes 
introduced in section 4. We compare the results for the different schemes and discuss their 
possible implications for future regulatory decisions. 
6.1.  Requiring best practice 
We first consider the environmental outcome from best management practice. This is 
compared to the environmental target specified by BoPRC and the cost of achieving the same 
environmental outcome using the export capping and export trading scheme approaches. 
Figure 8 gives the total lake loads under best practice regulation and under the R-300 
scenario. The load paths for both schemes assume that there is a step change in land-use, and 
hence exports, in 2015. We also give the load path without regulation and the legacy loads for 
comparison. 
Figure 8: Nutrient Loads under best practice regulation 
 
We observe that the load paths for best practice and land retirement result in lake loads 
that are less than the environmental target in the short run  and increase to exceed the 
environmental target in the long run. The shape of these load paths is due to the abrupt change 
in nitrogen leaching in 2015. Under regulation the manageable loads have a step decrease, due to 
surface water, in 2015 and then slowly build up as nitrogen flows through the groundwater. The 
unmanageable and legacy loads decrease smoothly. The aggregate effect is that loads decrease in 



































Best Practice R-300 Scenario Target
Before Regulation Legacy Loads29 
 
If regulation were to be implemented in the Lake Rotorua catchment, we would most 
likely observe a more gradual decrease in lake loads as landowners would require a transition 
period toward full regulation. 
In our model all approaches reach their long-run lake loads by 2210 and are flat after 
this. Requiring landowners to implement best practice on their land results in long run loads of 
499 tN/yr. The R-300 scenario results in long run loads of 421 tN/yr.
5
Implementing best practice results in a decrease in nitrogen exports and long-run lake 
loads by 242 tN/yr in the long run. Although this satisfies the environmental target in the short 
run, by itself it is not sufficient to ensure acceptable lake quality in the long run. This suggests 
that some land retirement will be necessary to meet the environmental target for the lake. 
 
Using NManager we estimated the cost of best practice. For comparison we estimated 
the cost of achieving an identical environmental impact using the export capping and export 
trading approaches. Table 6 gives the net present value (NPV) of the cost of mitigation for the 
different approaches.
6
Table 6: NPV of the cost of mitigation for best practise load path 
 
Scheme  Best Practice  Export Capping  Nutrient Trading 
NPV ($ millions)  36.4  35.0  37.0 
We observe a similar NPV for the cost of mitigation, required to achieve the load path 
given in Figure 8, for all three regulatory approaches. The differences in cost will be due to how 
mitigation is distributed between the different farm types under the different regulations. 
Figure 9 gives estimates for the long run proportion of land in each of the land-uses 
under the different regulatory approaches. Land-use under best practice regulation is identical to 
land-use before regulation. 
   
                                                 
5 This assumes that nutrient leaching per ha stays constant within each land use. 
6 The NPV of the cost of mitigation for the R-300 scenario is $61.0 million. As this cost arises from a 
different environmental outcome to best practice it is not directly comparable. 30 
 
Figure 9: Long Run Distribution of Land corresponding to Best Practice Lake Loads 
 
We observe that there is minimal change in the land used for dairy farming, this is due to 
amount of mitigation possible on dairy land without land-use change. Under export trading 
regulation, NManager estimates that only sheep & beef land is retired into forestry. The land use 
changes associated with the export trading scheme could be associated with a 27% decrease in 
agricultural employment, a 26% increase in forestry employment and 10% decrease in total 
employment.
7
These figures were constructed assuming that where a change in land-use is necessary 
dairy land is replaced by sheep & beef land, and sheep & beef land is replaced by forestry.
 
8
6.2.  The performance of straightforward regulation 
 
We now consider the effect of land retirement, the export capping scheme, and nutrient 
trading. For these approaches we require that regulation results in the lake loads under regulation 
given in Figure 10. The load path without regulation and the legacy loads are provided for 
comparison.
9
   
 
                                                 
7 From the Agricultural Census, June 2007, and the Linked Employer-Employee Database, Junes 2007, 
both provided by Statistics New Zealand, we estimate 4.48 Agricultural (dairy and sheep & beef) employees per 
1000 hectares and 2.09 forestry employees per 1000 hectares. Before regulation this gives 93 agricultural employees, 
44 forestry employees and 137 employees across both categories. 
8 Any change in other land-use is due to rounding. 
9 As these lake loads differ from those shown in Figure 8 we cannot compare the NPV of the costs of 

































Figure 10: Nutrient loads required for regulation comparison 
 
The load path under regulation was specified so that the long run environmental target 
for the lake would be reached in fifty years and nitrogen loads would remain approximately 
constant from then onwards. Although lake loads reach their long run value in fifty years, due to 
groundwater lags, nitrogen exports must be managed for much longer and allowance caps are 
reduced over 200 years. 
The lake loads under the different regulatory schemes were matched to the specified load 
path by controlling the stringency of the regulation. For land retirement, NManager determined 
the percentages of dairy and sheep & beef land to retire as a function of time such that, after 
accounting for groundwater lags, the lake load matched the specified environmental outcome. 
For the export capping scheme, NManager determined the percentage reduction in leaching 
required from year to year  such that, after accounting for groundwater lags, the lake loads 
matched the specified target trajectory.  For the trading schemes, NManager determined the 
allowance caps necessary for each year. 
Despite these regulatory approaches having identical environmental outcomes, the cost 
of mitigation under these schemes is not the same. Under the regulatory schemes the distribution 
of mitigation between dairy farmers and sheep & beef farmers differs. The cost of mitigation is 
not uniform for either type of farmer. The more mitigation a farmer must conduct the more 
expense each additional reduction in nitrogen becomes; the marginal cost of mitigation increase. 
It follows, that a regulatory scheme where one type of farmer must do the majority of the 
mitigation will be more costly overall than a scheme where mitigation is shared between both 



































Environmental Target Under Regulation
Before Regulation Legacy Loads32 
 
Note that this does not imply that the quantity of mitigation required should be divided 
evenly between all farmers. Some farmers will face lower costs of mitigating so they can mitigate 
more than others farmers for the same total cost to each farmer. Ideally, each farmer would pay 
an equal share of the cost of reducing lake loads. 
Table 7: NPV of the Cost of Mitigation for Straightforward Regulatory Systems 
Scheme  Land-Retirement  Export Capping  Nutrient Trading 
Cost to Dairy ($ millions)  1.6  18.9  9.7 
Cost to Sheep & Beef ($ millions)  28.0  4.7  10.1 
Total Cost ($ millions)  29.6  23.6  19.8 
Table 7 gives the NPV of the cost of mitigation, estimated by NManager, under each of 
the schemes.
 10
Under the export trading scheme the marginal cost of mitigation is the same for both 
types of farmers. In contrast, under land retirement and the export capping scheme a greater 
proportion of the mitigation is borne by sheep & beef farmers and dairy farmers respectively 
who therefore face a higher marginal cost of mitigation. While this reduces the cost of mitigation 
faced by the other type of land-use, it results in an overall increase in the cost of mitigation. 
 We observe that the cost of mitigation under the export capping scheme is 20% 
less than under land-retirement and that the cost of mitigation under the export trading scheme 
costs 16% less than under the export capping scheme. 
All three forms of regulation result in changes in land-use in the surrounding catchment. 
Figure 11 estimates the long run proportion of land in each of the land-uses under the different 
approaches.  
Figure 11: Distribution of Land under different regulatory schemes 
 
                                                 


































We observe that land retirement results in a significant decrease in the amount of land 
used for dairy and sheep & beef farming in the catchment. This is because all land that was 
initially sheep & beef land was converted to forestry and about half of the dairy land was retired 
to sheep & beef; no mitigation took place other than via a change in land-use. 
Under an export capping scheme the higher cost of mitigation borne by dairy farmers, in 
comparison to the export trading scheme, results in a greater reduction in the land used for dairy 
farming. Although the net change in the percentage of land used for sheep & beef farming is 
only two percentage points under the export capping scheme, the actual change in land-use 
would be much more significant as less productive sheep & beef land is retired into forestry and 
less productive dairy land is retired into sheep & beef. 
We observe minimal change in the amount of land used for dairy farming under an 
export trading scheme because of the high potential for mitigation to take place on dairy land 
without a change in land-use and the high profitability of dairy relative to sheep & beef.
11
The changes in land-use given in 
 The 
contrast between land-use under land retirement and land-use under export trading suggests that 
there is significant potential for mitigation to take place without a change in land-use. 
Figure  11  imply changes in employment under 
regulation. Land retirement results in a 74% decrease in agricultural employment, a 73% increase 
in forestry employment and a 27% decrease in total employment. The export capping scheme 
results in a 20% decrease in agricultural employment, a 20% increase in forestry employment and 
a 7% decrease in total employment. The export trading scheme results in a 41% decrease in 
agricultural employment, a 40% increase in forestry employment and a 15% decrease in total 
employment. 
6.3.  More complex trading schemes 
We have observed a gain in the cost effectiveness of regulation when moving from an 
export capping scheme to an export trading scheme. This gain in cost effectiveness arises from a 
change in the distribution of mitigation between dairy farmers and sheep & beef farmers. 
We now consider the vintage trading schemes to determine whether further gains in cost 
effectiveness are possible from further changes in the distribution of mitigation. Following the 
work in section 6.2, we require that the vintage schemes result in the lake loads under regulation 
given in Figure 10. 
                                                 
11 Recall dairy land can mitigate to have leaching of 28 kg N/ha/yr. 34 
 
Under a vintage trading scheme, lag times differ about the catchment As a result, there 
are possible trade-offs between  landowners at the back of the catchment initially delaying 
mitigation, by buying allowances from landowners at the front of the catchment, although this 
means landowners at the front of the catchment will need to mitigate more heavily in the future. 
Figure 12 gives the percentage of manageable nitrogen within each lag zone, before 
regulation, that is mitigated under regulation.
12
Figure 12: Percentage of nutrients within each lag zone mitigated 
 For example, 70% of the nitrogen in lag zone 4 is 
mitigated under an export trading scheme. This percentage rises to 83% under the 2 pulse 
scheme and to 97% under the 1 pulse vintage scheme. 
 
From the export trading scheme, we observe that approximately 70% of all manageable 
nitrogen must be mitigated to reach the environmental target. Under an export trading scheme 
this mitigation is relatively evenly distributed across the catchment. Both the vintage schemes 
result in an increase in the percentage of mitigation for lag zones closer to the lake and a 
decrease in mitigation for the lag zones further from the lake. This effect is much more 
pronounced for the 1 pulse vintage scheme that for the 2 pulse scheme. 
Under the export trading scheme landowners in each lag zone faced the same price for 
allowances in each year and therefore will have the same marginal costs of mitigation per hectare. 
However, under the vintage schemes the nominal price of allowances changes from year to year 
                                                 
12 For each lag zone: percentage mitigated = (exports before regulation – exports after regulation) / 
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with the interest rate as the real value of allowances remains the same.
13
Table 8
 Hence, under the vintage 
schemes, landowners face different nominal prices of allowances, depending on the year in 
which they must surrender allowances, and therefore will have different marginal costs of 
mitigation per hectare.   gives the NPV of the cost of mitigation under each of the trading 
schemes. 
Table 8: Comparison of Different Trading Schemes 
Scheme  Nutrient Trading  1 Pulse Vintage 
Trading 
2 Pulse Vintage 
Trading 
NPV ($ millions)  19.8  24.0  19.6 
We observe that the 1 pulse vintage scheme is less cost effective than the export trading 
scheme and that the 2 pulse vintage scheme has about the same cost of mitigation as the export 
trading scheme. This suggests that there are not significant gains in cost effectiveness from 
introducing a more complex regulatory scheme and that a poor choice of regulatory lag times 
may result in less cost-effective regulation. 
All the schemes will result in changes in land-use in the catchment. Figure 13 gives the 
long run proportion of land in each of the land-uses under the different trading schemes. 
Figure 13: Distribution of Land under different trading schemes 
 
Both vintage trading schemes result in almost all the nitrogen in lag zones 1-3 being 
mitigated and the land converted to forestry. However, as these lag zones are small they only 
contribute to about a two percentage point increase in the amount of land in forestry over the 
export trading scheme. 
                                                 
13 Landowners should be indifferent between buying an allowance now for $30 and investing the cost of 




































The significant change in the percentage of land in forestry between the export trading 
and 1 pulse vintage schemes is due to mitigation in lag zones 4 and 5. At least 90% of the 
nitrogen in these lag zones is mitigated under the 1 pulse scheme and hence much of the land is 
converted to forestry. Despite this, the 1 pulse vintage scheme does not result in as much land 
being retired to forestry as we observe under the land retirement approach. As all three schemes 
result in the same loads to the lake each year they will also result in similar exports from the land 
each year. 
7. Discussion and Conclusions 
We have described NManager and used it to evaluate a range of possible designs of 
regulations to improve water quality. Our results suggest that different designs of regulation will 
result in significant differences in the cost of mitigation. 
Simulation results of regulation requiring best practice suggest that changes in nitrogen 
leaching without changes in land-use will not be sufficient to meet the environmental target for 
the lake in the long run. In contrast, simulation results of land retirement regulation suggest that 
a significant proportion of the catchment would need to be retired into forestry in order to meet 
the environmental target. It is likely that a mixture of these two approaches, as represented by 
the export capping or export trading regulation, would be preferable. 
By controlling the stringency of regulation we were able to ensure that the  land 
retirement, export capping, export trading and vintage trading schemes resulted in the same 
environmental outcome: to achieve the lake load target of 435 tN/yr within fifty years. There is 
at least a 16% reduction in the cost of mitigation between the export capping and export trading 
schemes where the lake loads match those given in Figure 10 due to changes in the distribution 
of mitigation between dairy farmers and sheep & beef farmers. 
However, it is likely that our results under-estimate the gain from trading schemes over 
an export capping scheme as we has assumed all farms of the same type are homogeneous. 
Where there are heterogeneous farmers we would expect greater gains from the implementation 
of a trading scheme. Estimation of the real gain from trading scheme regulations would require 
knowledge about the heterogeneity in the actual mitigation costs faced by farmers. These will be 
farm specific and require more detailed information than we had access to for this research. 
It should also be noted that our load fitting algorithm depends on the shape of our profit 
functions. In constructing the profit functions used in NManager we have assumed that the cost 
of converting land to a less nitrogen intensive land-use is small. Introducing costs for land 37 
 
conversion would encourage mitigation to take place with minimal change in land-use and could 
significantly increase the cost of mitigation for all results where mitigation requires changes in 
land-use. 
The costs of mitigation quantified in this report are not the total costs of restoring the 
lake.  There will be additional  costs to the regulator associated with implementing and 
administrating the regulation that are not accounted for in the costs reported here. 
Comparing the export trading and vintage trading schemes suggests that there are 
minimal (or negative) gains in cost effectiveness to be made from more complex regulation. This 
may be due to the choices of lag times or due to the nature of the catchment. We observe that 
there is only a small amount of land in lag zones 1-3, hence only a small amount of mitigation 
can be traded from the back of the catchment to the front. The share of nitrogen that travels via 
groundwater is 70% and some nitrogen takes more than 200 years to reach the lake. If the 
distribution of land were more equal between lag zones or the groundwater flow different then 
the vintage trading schemes might have been more cost effective. 
Our estimates of land-use change suggest that meeting the environmental target for Lake 
Rotorua will require the amount of land used for forestry to increase by 10-20% of the 
catchment area. This will be supported by a reduction in the amount of dairy and sheep & beef 
land.  We observe that the percentage of dairy land need not decrease significantly under 
regulation. This suggests that there is significant potential for mitigation to occur on existing 
dairy farms. 
In our analysis we have assumed that all land in the catchment is affected by regulation. 
In practice, some land will be excluded from regulation due to the high cost of including it 
relative to the possible nitrogen reduction from that land. Some properties, for example below a 
certain  size, might  be  excluded from regulation. This would increase the quantity of 
unmanageable loads from those estimated in this paper  and decrease the amount of land 
available for mitigation. The same amount of mitigation would be distributed over a smaller area 
and hence the cost of mitigation would rise from that estimated here. 
NManager is a partial equilibrium model. Its solutions assume that regulation within the 
catchment does not affect input prices.
14
                                                 
14  It also assumes that output prices are unaffected. Given that most output is exported this is a 
reasonable assumption. 
 This may not be reasonable in the short run when 
workers are immobile and capital for investments in mitigation is scarce. NManager also ignores 
the pressure imposed on land outside the catchment as land-use within the catchment changes 38 
 
under regulation.  As more complex regulatory schemes have higher costs of information 
landowners will be more likely to seek satisfactory rather than optimal solutions. There will be a 
range of satisfactory solutions many of which will be similar but not identical to the optimal 
solution. Determining the implications of this range of solutions is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
The current version of NManager ignores uncertainty as assuming that landowners have 
perfect information and foresight to plan 100, or more, years ahead. However landowners are 
unlikely to plan more than 10 years ahead due to uncertainty and bounded rationality (the longest 
bond offered by the New Zealand Treasury is 12 years). Uncertainty could be introduced into 
the model by considering landowners’ expectations of future leaching and land-use. This has 
been left for future research. 
Our results have been discussed in the context of nitrogen levels in the Lake Rotorua 
catchment in the Bay of Plenty, New Zealand. The management of nutrients in water ways and 
water bodies is a potential issue in any environment where nutrient use is intensifying. The 
NManager model is not bound to the Lake Rotorua catchment and could be parameterized to 
conduct the same analysis in another context. 
 
 
8. Appendix A: The Optimization of Nutrient Trading Systems 
In section 5.3 we gave a formal presentation of the model for an export trading scheme. 
We now present how this model is generalized to account for a vintage trading scheme and the 
optimization routine that is used to solve both approaches. 
8.1.  Solving the vintage trading schemes 
Suppose there are 𝑀 landowners. Production for landowner 𝑖 at time 𝑡 depends on their 
quantity of nutrient exports 𝑥𝑖𝑡. The profit for landowner 𝑖, at time 𝑡 is given by: 
𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓 𝑖( 𝑥𝑖𝑡 ) 
Let { 𝑣𝑖𝑘}  , 𝑘 = 1,…,𝐾, be the lag times specified by the regulatory scheme for 
landowner 𝑖. The percentage of exports it carried to the lake at lag time 𝑘 is given by 𝜃𝑘. In the 
one pulse vintage scheme K= 1 and 𝜃1 = 1. In the two pulse vintage scheme 𝐾 = 2, 𝜃1 = 0.3 
and 𝜃2 = 0.7. The surface water flow has a lag time of zero for all lag zones (  𝑣𝑖1 = 0 for all  ). 39 
 
For each lag time landowners must surrender 𝜃𝑘𝑥𝑖𝑡 allowances of vintage 𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑘. Profit 
seeking landowners will choose 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗  the quantity of N exports that maximizes their profit net of 
allowance holdings as follows: 
𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑥𝑖𝑡
∗ ({𝑃t};𝑟,{𝑣𝑖𝑘}) = 𝐚𝐫𝐠𝐦𝐚𝐱 �𝑓 𝑖(𝑥𝑖𝑡) − 𝑥𝑖𝑡(�𝜃𝑘
1
(1 + 𝑟)𝑣𝑖𝑘 𝑃𝑡+𝑣𝑖𝑘)
𝑘
� 
Where 𝑟 is the discount rate and 𝑃𝑡 is the price of allowances of vintage 𝑡. Vintage trading 
schemes require landowners to hold allowances of the same vintage in different years. All 
landowners must face the same real price for allowances. As mitigation each year is determined 
by the nominal price of allowances NManager discounts the price of each allowance into the year 
of purchase. Results in this paper use a 7% discount rate. 
The total demand for allowances of vintage 𝑡 is given by: 





Let 𝑆𝑡 be the supply or quota of allowances available for vintage 𝑡. The excess demand 
for allowances, 𝐹𝑡, can be expressed as follows: 
𝐹𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡 =  𝑔�𝑃𝑡−𝑣𝑖𝐾,…,𝑃𝑡,…,𝑃𝑡+𝑣iK;𝑟,{𝑣𝑖𝑘}� − 𝑆𝑡 
The market clearing prices will be {𝑃𝑡} such that for all vintage markets: 
𝐹𝑡 ≤ 0   𝑎𝑛𝑑   𝐹𝑡 𝑃𝑡 = 0 
The price in each market will depend on the supply and demand in that market. 
Therefore we may express the price for each vintage as follows: 
𝑃𝑡 = ℎ( 𝐷𝑡,𝑆𝑡 ) =  ℎ� 𝑔�𝑃𝑡−𝑣𝑖𝐾,…,𝑃𝑡,…,𝑃𝑡+𝑣iK;𝑟,{𝑣𝑖𝑘}�, 𝑆𝑡 � 
Given price in this form we then use an iterative numerical method to determine the 
price of vintage allowances in equilibrium. 
8.2.  Handling boundary conditions 
Incorporating groundwater lags in the vintage trading schemes requires landowners to 
hold allowances of the same vintage in different years. Unless these schemes have a fixed 
duration, finding an exact solution would require solving over an infinite length of time. 40 
 
We may find a finite approximation to the solution under two assumptions: The first is 
weak dependence between markets: If we choose 𝜔  sufficiently large then the dependence 
between markets at time 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 𝜔 is weak. The second is price convergence: All the prices 
beyond some time 𝑇 are constant and equal to price 𝑃𝑇. This assumption is reasonable so long as 
by time 𝑇 the number of allowances is constant. 
Assuming convergence of vintage prices may introduce error into the results by creating 
artificially stable prices. Testing of different thresholds suggests that 𝑇 = 400 is sufficient to 
minimize any artificial stability if we limit our results to the first 200 years. 
8.3.  Solving trading schemes numerically 
A solution over 𝑇 time periods may be found using the Newton-Raphson algorithm: 
Starting from an initial price vector [𝑃𝑡]0  iterate,  until all prices satisfy the market clearing 
conditions, updating the prices at each iteration as follows: 






Where [𝑃𝑡]𝑖 and [𝐹𝑡]𝑖 are column vectors and �
𝜕𝑔𝑗
𝜕𝑃𝗿
� is the 𝑇 × 𝑇 derivative matrix. 
The vector [𝐹𝑡]𝑖  is calculated numerically as given above. An approximation to the 






∗�[𝑃𝑘]𝑖 + 𝜕𝑃 𝗿;𝑟,{𝑣𝑖𝑘}��
𝜕𝑃 𝗿
 
Where  𝜕𝑃 𝗿  is a vector of zeros except for the 𝗿𝑡ℎ  entry which suitably small,  and 
𝑔𝑗
∗�[𝑃𝑘]𝑖;𝑟,{𝑣𝑖𝑘}� is the demand for allowances of vintage 𝑗 if landowners have optimized their 
allowance holdings. 
We include an adjustment to handle the situation where the vintage caps  are non-
binding. This occurs where 𝑃𝑡 = 0 and 𝐹𝑡 < 0. In this situation we wish to prevent any further 
decrease in the price of the vintage. This can be done by deleting the rows of [𝑃𝑡]𝑖 and [𝐹𝑡]𝑖 and 
the rows and columns of �
𝜕𝑔𝑗
𝜕𝑃𝑘
� that correspond to the non-binding vintage caps before updating 
[𝑃𝑡]𝑖 to generate [𝑃𝑡]𝑖+1. 41 
 
9. Appendix B: The Input for the Profit Functions 
The profit functions used in NManager were fitted to estimated profit and mitigation 
points for dairy, sheep & beef farming and plantation forestry. This section explains how these 
points were estimated. 
9.1.  Profit and leaching for dairy and sheep & beef farming 
Output from Farmax was used to determine the profitability and leaching of different 
farm management practices for dairy and sheep & beef farming. Farmax works from baseline 
scenarios provided by monitor farms. Monitor farms are theoretical farms, constructed from 
current data, designed to represent a typical farm in a specific region Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries, 2010b. 
The Waikato/Bay of Plenty dairy monitor farm is representative of approximately 5060 
dairy farms in the Waikato and Bay of Plenty regions. The monitor farm has 110 hectares of 
land, milks 310 cows (heifers are grazed off the farm for 12 months) and produces around 
97,000 kg of milk solids in a normal season. This implies a gross profit of around $127,000 in 
2009 Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 2010a. 
The Waikato/Bay of Plenty sheep &  beef  monitor farm is representative of 
approximately 720 sheep & beef farms in the Waikato and Bay of Plenty regions. The monitor 
farm has 300 hectares of land, 2900 stock units and a gross profit of around $53,000 in 2009 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 2010a. 
Different scenarios for the dairy model included various combinations of changes in cow 
stocking rates, wintering patterns, imported feed usage and nitrogen fertilizer usage. Different 
scenarios for the sheep & beef model included changes to stocking rates, animal ratios (sheep vs. 
cattle; bulls vs. cows) and nitrogen fertilizer usage. Although Farmax is designed to assist the user 
to maximize their profit per hectare the model is dependent on the user to propose and assess 
the feasibility of different management decisions. We recognise and thank Smeaton who used his 
farming knowledge and expertise in attempting to define profit maximizing strategies for 
landowners while maintaining specified leaching targets (Smeaton, Duncan et al., 2011). 
9.2.  Profit and leaching for forestry 
Forestry is the least nutrient intensive land-use considered for the Lake Rotorua 
catchment. Landowners may choose to convert land to forestry as part of managing  their 
nutrient leaching. 42 
 
Annual profits per hectare from forestry were calculated for all non-urban parcels in the 
catchment. Profit for each parcel was calculated using a forest profitability map from 2009, see 
documentation in Zhang (2010). This considers information on land slope, soil type and the 
distance from the nearest port. These measures were used to estimate wood yield and the costs 
of planting, pruning and logging. Lastly, profit for each land parcel was averaged over the entire 
catchment. 
New Zealand has implemented an Emissions Trading Scheme. Under this scheme the 
profitability of forestry is expected to increase. However, landowners are currently behaving as 
though the effective long term price for carbon is close to zero. This is due to uncertainty in the 
future price of carbon and the lack of relevant standards (Karpas and Kerr, 2011). The potential 
gain in profits from forestry under New Zealand’s Emission Trading Scheme is therefore not 
included in NManager. 
10.  Appendix C: Risks of the Two Pulse Vintage Scheme 
We observed in section 8.1 that under the two pulse vintage scheme the price of each 
vintage allowance depends on the prices of all other vintage allowances. A two pulse vintage 
scheme can result in short term oscillations in the equilibrium price of vintages. This is due to 
landowners demanding vintages of two different types to cover leaching from a single year of 
production. 
Regulatory schemes that result in price oscillations may have additional costs associated 
with them. There may be adjustment costs in responding to changes in vintage prices or the cost 
effectiveness gains of the trading scheme may decrease if allowance trading is discouraged. 
Figure 14 gives the equilibrium prices of allowances arising from the two pulse scheme. 
We observe short run oscillations in prices with a period of 20 years. Please note that these 
oscillations do not affect the accuracy of our results as we only consider the first 200 years of 
vintages, where price oscillations are minimal, elsewhere in this paper. 
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Figure 14: Oscillations in the equilibrium prices of vintages under two pulse regulation 
 
The short run price oscillations are the result of regularities in the lag times. Consider the 
differences between the lag zones as given in Table 5. There is a 20 year difference between 
consecutive lag times for the five lag zones at the back of the catchment (lag zones 4 – 8). This 
corresponds perfectly to the 20 year periodicity of the short run price oscillations. 
While oscillations are demonstrated here using the two pulse vintage scheme they are a 
possible phenomenon of any regulatory scheme where landowners must surrender allowances of 
more than one vintage in any given year.  Experiments have shown that the frequency and 
magnitude of price oscillations depends on the lag times. This suggests that price oscillations 
may be avoidable given careful design of the regulatory scheme. 
The price oscillations demonstrated here occur under the assumption that each 
landowner’s mitigation decisions are independent across time.  However, if landowners have 
adaptive price expectation or the cost of changing mitigation practises is significant then 
landowners will have incentives to keep the same mitigation practises over several years. This 
may reduce the magnitude of the price oscillations (Krugman, Paul, 1991). Incorporating 
landowner expectations into NManager is an area for future research. 
An observant reader may have noted the suggestion of long run cycles, with a period of 
150 years, in Figure 14. Experiments suggest this cycle is independent of the timing of pulses. It 
is likely that this is an unavoidable phenomenon of a two pulse regulatory scheme. As the long 
run cycle has minimal affect on allowances prices between years (less than a $1 or 2% effect) we 
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